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Abstract
As  the  cost  and  amount  of  information  security  breaches  continue  to  rise,  information  security
management  becomes  vital  for  organizations.  Often  organization  seek  advice  from  information
security management standards and other frameworks to manage their information security.  Such
standards and frameworks  depict  information security  management  as  a rational,  systematic  and
linear process and leave out the complexity and uncertainty of real-life settings. In particular, they pay
little  attention  to  the  organizational  and  social  challenges  inherent  in  information  security
management.  Therefore,  this  study  draws  on  the  practice  theory  to  develop  a  practice  lens  for
understanding  how  people,  practices  and  what  happens  in  practice  interact  and  create  such
challenges. This lens depicts information security management as emerging from mundane aspects of
information security management work and from the enacted social structures of and events arising at
an organization and its environment and enables a deeper understanding of the organizational and
social challenges. After developing this lens, it is illustrated and elaborated through an ethnographic
study at an IT service provider, and its contributions to research and practice discussed. 
Keywords: Information security management, information security policy, practice theory.
1 INTRODUCTION
The cost of information security (hereafter InfoSec) breaches is increasing (Ponemon Institute 2012).
An industry survey reported that 76 % of respondent organizations have already had or expect to have
a breach that results in the loss of customers or business partners (Ponemon Institute 2013). In order to
prevent breaches and to safeguard their information assets from various types of threats, organizations
use controls (i.e., countermeasures, safeguards) (Smith et al. 2010). To plan for, select, implement, and
monitor the effectiveness of the controls,  organizations need comprehensive InfoSec management.
Several InfoSec management frameworks have been developed by both researchers and practitioners
including the participatory risk management approach from Spears and Barki (2010) and a process-
based framework suggested by Björck (2005); and international standards such as ISO/IEC27001 and
the System Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM). Researchers have further
contributed by proposing different controls and a means for implementing them and measuring their
effectiveness.
The developed frameworks view InfoSec management as a process; a rather linear, systematic and
rationalist one (e.g., Björck 2005; ISO/IEC 2005; Straub and Welke 1998). Typically those suggest
that the process begins with the setting of objectives and the identification of the current  state of
InfoSec, proceeds with the development and execution of comprehensive plans and implementation
programs, and concludes with a systematic analysis and objective evaluation of the results. Similarly,
most of the traditional InfoSec controls are means-ends-oriented (Siponen 2005). Although rationalist
approaches to InfoSec management prevail in the literature (Njenga and Brown 2012), the complexity,
uncertainty, and political nature of managing in real-life situations set the limits on the applicability of
such rationalist approaches (Wilson 2009). InfoSec managers make decisions in situations that involve
contradictory  objectives,  large  number  of  actors,  potentially  conflicting  motives,  and  with  partial
information. While researchers agree that InfoSec is not merely a technical issue but includes human
and social  aspects  (e.g.,  Ashenden 2008;  Rainer et  al.  2007),  humans  and their  part  in managing
InfoSec have been essentially absent in the extant literature. More research is needed to contribute to a
better understanding of organizational and social aspects of InfoSec management (Coles-Kemp 2009).
This study responds to these calls by developing a practice lens for understanding and analysing the
organizational  and social  challenges  inherent  in  InfoSec  management.  The lens  is  elaborated and
illustrated through an ethnographic study that analyses how InfoSec professionals struggled to develop
and implement an information classification policy at an IT service provider. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section builds the theoretical background of the
study by discussing InfoSec management and developing a practice lens for understanding it. The lens
is then illustrated and elaborated through an empirical study. Finally, findings are discussed in regard
to theoretical and practical implications and conclusions are drawn.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
While research has traditionally viewed InfoSec as a technical issue (Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen
2007),  recently researchers have argued that  such a view has significant  limitations (Straub et  al.
(2008);  Hsu et  al.  2012).  Literature  on InfoSec management  is  emerging (Ransbotham and Mitra
2009).  This  literature  often  depicts  InfoSec  management  as  a  collection  of  InfoSec  controls  (i.e.
technical, operational, and management measures that should be implemented in an organization in
order to secure organization's information) and as wider frameworks for planning, implementing and
monitoring them (i.e. management systems). InfoSec encompasses both the process and the resulting
controls (Spears and Barki 2010). Several InfoSec management frameworks have been suggested in
the literature, most of which posit InfoSec management as a process. The process is depicted as a
linear  progression  from identification  of  the  needs  (e.g.,  through risk  analysis),  through systemic
information gathering and analysing, to an objective evaluation that leads to rational decision in regard
to  implemented  controls.  For  example,  Björck  (2005)  describes  a  process  that  includes  the  three
phases  of  (1)  evaluation during which the current  state  of  organization's  InfoSec  is  assessed;  (2)
formation during which controls to found vulnerabilities and deficiencies are designed and developed;
and (3) implementation where the selected controls are implemented. Finally,  a feedback-operation
provides  information  about  the  implemented  controls.  Straub  and  Welke  (1998)  emphasize  the
formalized  planning  and  feedback  mechanisms  in  their  process  and  propose  the  phases  of  (1)
recognition of the security problem or need; (2) risk analysis; (3) generation of control alternatives; (4)
planning and deciding for suitable controls; and (5) implementation. Similarly, de jure international
InfoSec management standard ISO/IEC 27001 (ISO/IEC 2005), underlies that InfoSec management
should be a continuous, formalized process of identifying,  selecting, implementing and monitoring
InfoSec controls.
Hsu et al. (2012) argued that managers, at least Koreans, value a rationalized InfoSec management
process to manage risks. Straub and Welke (1998) further argue that through a formalized planning
and feedback mechanisms, InfoSec managers become more aware of different controls and can select
the  most  effective  ones.  Scholars  have,  however,  also  criticized  the  strictly  formalized  InfoSec
management process (Anttila et al. 2012). In addition, standards such as ISO/IEC27001 have been
subject to scholarly criticism. In particular, Siponen (2006) criticizes them by suggesting that they
concentrate on prescribing InfoSec management processes but leave the content of these processes
aside. Moreover, insightful studies of Backhouse et al. (2006) and Hsu (2009) illustrate how politics
and power issues or institutional isomorphism are in play not only during the organizational adoption
of such processes but also during the international standardization process of the InfoSec management
standard. Their studies illustrate how the processes are a far from rational, linear ones. Indeed, InfoSec
management likely involves struggles and improvisations (Njenga and Brown 2012), value conflicts
(Hedström et al. 2011), incongruent frames of reference (Niemimaa et al. 2013) or struggles around
power (Kolkowska and Dhillon 2013). Nevertheless, previous research has not provided a lens for
understanding such challenges of InfoSec management in an organizational context. The present study
therefore  proposes  a  practice  lens  for  InfoSec  management  that  builds  on  the  central  theoretical
constructs of the practice theory.
2.1 Towards a Practice Lens for Understanding Information Security Management
The emerging field of practice theory has been widely applied in a broad range of domains, including
innovation (Dougherty 2004),  information systems  and information  technology (Levina and Vaast
2005; Levina and Vaast 2006; Orlikowski 1996; Orlikowski 2008), and institutional change (Smets et
al. 2012). The 'practice turn' in contemporary social theory and management research pays particular
attention  to  how the  detailed  activity  and societal  context  are  closely linked and recognizes  that
seemingly minutiae of mundane activity is connected to and may reproduce wider social phenomena
that lie outside organizational boundaries (Whittington 2006). As a result, focusing on practice implies
being  attentive  to  people's  recurrent  everyday activities  (Feldman  and Orlikowski  2011).  Practice
theory  is  particularly  prominent  analytical  tool  for  analysing  and  theorizing  about  contemporary
management  as it  is  understood to be complex,  dynamic,  distributed and emergent  (Feldman and
Orlikowski 2011). The three core themes of the theory are: (1) social structures and their impact on
practices; (2) individuals' actual activity 'in practice', often referred as praxis; and (3) individuals on
whose  initiative  and skills  the  activity  depends  on  (Whittington  2006).  According  to  this  theory,
society shapes and defines practices (i.e. shared understandings, cultural rules and norms, languages
and procedures) that both guide and enable human activity. Individuals' activity does not solely follow
the social practices but accounts for the situation in which the activity takes place. Practices and what
occurs  'in  practice'  are  not  the  same.  Finally,  the  practice  theory  depicts  individuals  as  'artful
interpreters of practices' (Bourdieu 1990). Their practical skills do make a difference. They reproduce
or alter the practices. The three themes are interlinked: 'Actor's particular activities cannot be detached
from society, for the rules and resources it furnishes are essential to their action. Society is, in turn,
itself produced by just this action.' (Whittington 2006, p.615).
In accordance with the three core themes of the practice theory, the proposed practice lens depicts
InfoSec  management  as  a  nexus  of  social  structures  and  situational  events,  actors  and  InfoSec
management praxis (Figure 1). It suggests that InfoSec management practices are influenced by shared
practical understandings, meanings and norms in regard to InfoSec that originate from wider social
structures and organization's business network as well as from organizational level structures. Practice
theory emphasizes that practices may be derived from the larger social fields or systems in which an
organization is embedded (Whittington 2006). Recently, Hsu (2009) illustrated the impact of society
by analysing  how institutional  forces were in play when an organization implemented an InfoSec
management standard. Similarly, ever increasing compliance requirements (e.g. related to protection
of personal data) are likely to shape InfoSec management practices. On another level, practices may
originate from organization's  business network.  Organizations are increasingly dependent  on other
organizations  for  value  creation  and  enter  into  business  networks  (Partanen  and  Möller  2012).
Traditional InfoSec management practices are not applicable to such networked business environments
(Anttila et al. 2012), thus practices are likely shaped by such networks. Finally, at the organizational
level,  practices might  be organization-specific,  embodied in the operating policies and procedures,
cultures and routines that shape local modes of managing InfoSec. 
Figure 1: Understanding information security management through a practice lens.
Actors  are  the  individuals  that  participate  in  various  ways  to  InfoSec  decision  making  in  an
organization; people who perform different activities related to InfoSec and carry its practices. They
are those who plan for, select, implement and monitor InfoSec controls. As InfoSec controls should be
aligned with business, actors likely include not only InfoSec professionals but also other actors that
perform  or  shape  InfoSec  management  (e.g.,  business  managers,  risk  managers  and  external
consultants). As actors take part into managing InfoSec, they draw up available practices from their
organizational and extra-organizational context (in Figure 1 illustrated as panels). The actors do not
slavishly follow the practices,  but  actors  are  merely artful  interpreters  of  the  practices  (Bourdieu
1990). This implies that they are able to seek novel solutions to problems. For example, Siponen and
Iivari (2006) argue that in exceptional situations where InfoSec policy and business requirements are
in conflict,  individuals must  find innovative ways  to address  the  business requirements  while  not
undermining InfoSec. Therefore, InfoSec management likely involves routine practices for familiar
situations and new, improvised practices that arise from non-recurring, unpredictable events. Finally,
the centre of the Figure 1 depicts what actors actually do; InfoSec management praxis including a
multitude  of  activities  involved  in  organizing  InfoSec.  It  is  the  work  required  for,  for  example,
planning, implementing and monitoring of InfoSec controls. It further likely includes political gambles
for executive buy-in, accommodating conflicting views of shareholders (Niemimaa et al. 2013) and
responding to unexpected events (Spagnoletti and Resca 2008). The actual activity is influenced not
only by the  social  structures  but  also  by the  situational  contingencies  where  activity  takes  place
(depicted as events in Figure 1). In a summary, the practice lens depicts InfoSec management as a non-
systematic, non-linear flow of InfoSec praxis where social structures and situational events influence
and are also shaped by the praxis. Practitioners are critical, active links between InfoSec praxis and the
organizational and extra-organizational practices that they draw on in this praxis.  The lens further
accounts for time on the horizontal axis and for context on the vertical axis.
3 RESEARCH APPROACH
The practice lens depicted in Figure 1 is elaborated and illustrated through an ethnographic study of
developing and implementing an InfoSec policy at Alpha (pseudonym), an IT service provider. Alpha
provides information system (IS) services to several Finnish companies that have been classified as
parts  of  society's  critical  infrastructure.  The services  include system development  and hosting for
systems  that  process  and store  personal  data  (i.e.,  data  that  is  regulated by privacy laws).  Alpha
provides a suitable context for elaborating the practice lens as it has mature InfoSec practices and was
developing and implementing a foundational InfoSec control – an InfoSec policy.
Ethnographic approach is well-suited for this study as it enables researcher to attend to a particular
context: 'Understanding actions and beliefs in their proper context provides the key to unravelling the
unwritten rules and taken-for-granted assumptions in an organization' (Myers 2009, p.93). It is an in-
depth research approach, characterized by the researcher spending prolonged period of time at the
research site seeing what people are doing as well as what they say they are doing (Myers 1999).
Consequently,  the ethnographic approach affords potential for a deep understanding of the people,
organization and the wider context, thus serving well for the purposes of elaborating the practice lens.
Empirical materials were collected through participant observation over a period of six months in 2012
and 2013. Participant observation is crucial for analysing practices (Schatzki 2005) and is the main
source of empirical materials in ethnographic studies (Myers 1999; Miettinen et al. 2009). During the
six months field study, I observed practitioners at their work, attended meetings with them, and shared
informal  situations  such  as  lunch  and  coffee  breaks  with  them.  I  conducted  numerous  informal
discussions with them. I reviewed organization's InfoSec documentation. Overall, this study benefits
from an  exceptional  access  to  the  research  site:  I  was  able  to  follow the  project  from the  very
beginning to the end and was given free access to the corporate premises and documentation. Finally,
but  importantly,  I  participated  in  their  practice,  which  gave  genuine  experience  of  InfoSec
management (cf. Carlo et al. 2012). I wrote field notes from the observations and discussions as well
as self-reflection notes from my own practice. Empirical materials were analysed in two steps. First, I
wrote  a  rich  chronological  story  of  the  development  and  implementation  of  the  InfoSec  policy
(Langley 1999). Second, the data analysis proceeded with interpretive reading of the story and field
notes in accordance with the themes of the practice lens. Themes included situational events, shared
understandings, meanings and norms on each of the three levels illustrated in the framework, actors,
and  aspects  of  InfoSec  management  process  in  terms  of  planning,  selecting,  implementing  and
monitoring information classification policy (i.e., InfoSec control). This analysis revealed six periods
through  which  policy  was  developed  and  implemented  (see  Table  1)  and  the  related  social  and
organizational challenges.
Period Actors and 
situational 
events
Praxis
Period 1: 
Policy 
development
-InfoSec 
professionals
-Consultancy company recommends an update to InfoSec policy and in its 
information classification section. 
-A project to review and update information classification policy is initiated. 
-Consultants craft the policy.
Challenges:
- Conflicts between InfoSec manager's and employees practices
- InfoSec professionals have no understanding of the changes policy introduces 
to employees' work. 
Situational events:
-New InfoSec manager is employed
Period 2: 
First policy 
implementa-
tion
-InfoSec 
professionals,
employees
-InfoSec manager publishes the policy and presents it in an employee meeting. 
Policy is welcomed with crushing feedback.
-Policy must be refined and employee feedback addressed.
Challenges:
-Policy is welcomed with crushing feedback as InfoSec professionals had 
inadequate understanding of employees' work and organizational practices.
-Reflecting the organizational practice of thorough reviews of new documents, 
employees had expected a chance to review the policy before implementation.
Period 3: 
Second 
policy 
development
-InfoSec 
professionals,
employees
-Consultant works on the policy with selected employees to address employees' 
views and to plan for a reimplementation. 
Challenges:
-Employees resist the policy.
-InfoSec professionals do not understand employee resistance.
Period 4: 
Second 
policy 
implementa-
tion
-InfoSec 
professionals,
employees, 
management
-Consultant introduces a modified policy in an employee meeting and is 
welcomed with a series of questions from employees.
-InfoSec managers introduces the policy to management group. Group requires 
that the policy is augmented with a more practical 'ABC guide to information 
classification'.
Challenges:
-Employees appeal to established practices of Alpha's business network and 
their lack of knowledge of InfoSec to argument why they cannot assume the 
responsibilities defined in the policy.
-Management group does not understand why Alpha needs information 
classification 
Period 5: 
Third policy 
development
-InfoSec 
professionals,
employees, 
management
-Consultant invites workshops to develop practical examples of information 
classification. He includes the feedback to the ABC guide.
-Management group reviews the guide.
Challenges:
 - Workshops reveal that policy's practices are not directly applicable to 
employees' work. 
Situational events:
-A new organizational structure is introduced that directly affects system owners
by espousing new responsibilities and roles.
Period 6: 
Third policy 
implementa-
tion
-InfoSec 
professionals,
employees, 
management
-InfoSec manager presents the policy and ABC guide in an employee meeting 
and receives only minimal feedback.
-Employees that are involved in the outsourcing project begin to understand the 
requirements for protecting information. They seek guidance the policy.
Situational events:
-A decision to outsource parts of its IS development to overseas.
Table 1: Analysis results
4 A PRACTICE LENS BASED ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY MANAGEMENT AT ALPHA 
The process of improving an existing InfoSec control, information classification policy, was far from
the rationalist, linear and well-planned process how InfoSec management is usually depicted. On the
contrary, it was rather messy and included several rounds of policy development and implementation.
A practice lens based analysis uncovered three main organizational and social challenges related to the
development and implementation of the information classification policy:  (1) conflicts between the
practices  employed  by  InfoSec  professionals  and  employees'  expectations;  (2)  conflicting
understandings between InfoSec professionals,  employees  and organization's  management;  and (3)
InfoSec  professionals'  inadequate  understanding  of  employees'  work.  Further,  situational  events
shaped the policy development and implementation.
First, conflicts between InfoSec professionals' practices and employees' expectations complicated the
policy development and implementation. While employee involvement and thorough reviews of all
new organizational documents were established organizational practices at Alpha, InfoSec manager
decided not to involve employees in policy development. Her decision reflected the practices of her
previous employer. Yet, organizational practice of Alpha subtly shaped employees' understandings and
expectations about the policy development and implementation; for them their involvement was self-
evident. This conflict first surfaced when the developed policy was introduced to employees. Second,
there  were  major  misunderstandings  between  InfoSec  professionals,  employees  and  Alpha's
management.  On  the  organizational  level,  Alpha's  employees  and  management  shared  an
understanding that only InfoSec professionals were responsible for InfoSec. Traditionally tasks that
could be interpreted as related to InfoSec, had been given to InfoSec professionals and employees had
not assumed any responsibilities about InfoSec. Employees further agreed that they did not have and
could not assume any responsibility over information stored in Alpha's IS. The shared understandings
manifested  themselves  during  the  policy  implementations  as  employee  resistance  towards  taking
responsibilities  required  by  the  information  classification  policy.  The  shared  understandings  also
legitimated this employee attitude, enforcing InfoSec professionals to make changes to information
classification policy. As a newly recruited, InfoSec manager was not aware of these understandings,
thus she did not account for them in her praxis.  Overall,  InfoSec professionals did not understand
employee resistance as their thought policy's practices were 'normal' practices in any organization. In
addition, business network level structures influenced the praxis; information classification was never
discussed  within  Alpha's  business  network  nor  aligned with  information  classification  policies  of
network members. InfoSec was not seen as a business network level issue but was regard as each
organization's private concern. Third, InfoSec professionals' inadequate understanding of employees'
work hindered the policy development and implementation. Clearly,  new InfoSec manager was not
familiar  with employees'  work  as  she  had  just  been employed.  Other  InfoSec professionals  were
external  consultants with a  varying  background at  Alpha.  The mode  of managing InfoSec further
meant  that  InfoSec professionals were not  involved in the tasks  employees  performed.  Therefore,
InfoSec professionals had no or only little understanding of employees' work and thus they had no
understanding  of  the  changes  new  policy  would  required  in  employees'  work.  As  the  first
implementation illustrated, the changes as perceived by employees were multifaceted. Finally, as the
case  illustrates,  InfoSec  praxis  does  not  occur  in  a  vacuum,  but  is  in  part  constituted  by events
surrounding the praxis. Organizational level events such as the introduction of a new InfoSec manager,
restructuring of the organization and outsourcing system development to overseas all modified the
flow of InfoSec praxis.  In particular,  the outsourcing of system development  and the related legal
pressures  and management  oversight  motivated employees  to ask questions  about  the information
classification from InfoSec professionals and to read the policy. 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The  practice  lens  proposed  in  this  paper  offers  an  alternative  to  existing  accounts  of  InfoSec
management by describing how people, practices and what happens in practice interact and create
organizational and social challenges to InfoSec management. This lens depicts InfoSec management as
emerging from mundane aspects of InfoSec management work and from the enacted social structures
of  and  events  arising  at  an  organization  and  its  environment.  It  provides  three  contributions  to
understanding of the organizational and social challenges of InfoSec management. First, it provides
content to the abstract phases of InfoSec management process suggested previously (e.g., Björck 2005;
Straub  and  Welke  1998;  ISO/IEC  27001).  This  is  important  as  the  existing  accounts  mainly
concentrate on prescribing the InfoSec management process and leave out what happens in the process
(Siponen 2006;  Siponen and Willison  2009).  Specifically,  the  lens  highlights  that  the  'content'  is
created by actors, practices and what happens in practice and facilitates the analysis and identification
of the role of individual actors, social structures ad situational events in this process. The elaboration
of  the  lens  in  an  ethnographic  study  illustrated  that  the  content  created  challenges  to  InfoSec
management work. Second, the lens contrasts with the existing accounts by highlighting that InfoSec
management process likely interacts with and is influenced by other social processes happening in an
organizational  context.  Particularly,  the  longitudinal  perspective  of  the  lens  revealed  how
implementation of an InfoSec policy proceeded from an initial decision, through various modifications
into final  implementation.  The implementation was connected to  other  processes  occurring at  the
organization during the implementation. Therefore, when we study InfoSec management, we should
remember Pettigrew's insightful note about studying organizational life: 'we are studying some feature
of organisational life not as if it represents one stream in one terrain, but more like a river basin where
there may be several streams all flowing into one another, dependent on one another for their life force
and shaping and being  shaped by varieties  of  terrain  each constraining and enabling  in  different
intensities and ways' (Pettigrew 1997, p.340). Finally, the lens suggests that researchers should focus
on what actors do (i.e., their praxis) as opposed to what they should do (e.g., prescriptions of InfoSec
standards)  or  what  they aspire  to  do.  Therefore,  it  resonates  with the  recent  elements  of  InfoSec
research which reinforce the idea that InfoSec practices matter only when their are enacted in practice
(cf.  Boss et al. 2009). The lens provides a theoretical lens and vocabulary for such an endeavour.
Consequently, it helps in addressing the limitation in the literature that while many InfoSec studies
have listed abstracted InfoSec practices, researchers have been encouraged to conduct in-depth studies
about  the  use  and application of  such  practices  in  organizations  (Siponen 2006).  Practice  lens  is
particularly well-suited for such studies. Together, these contributions demonstrate the value of using
practice theory in analysing InfoSec management. 
Implications for practice.  For practitioners, the lens offers insights on what factors may influence
and prove challenging in their InfoSec management  activities.  In contrast to InfoSec management
standards (e.g., ISO/IEC27001), the lens emphasizes that InfoSec managers have to acknowledge and
account for the multiple stakeholders, and the organizational, business network and social structures
that may all affect InfoSec management. Furthermore, the lens and its empirical illustration enhance
practitioners'  understanding  of  the  dynamics  of  InfoSec  management  in  an  organization  and  its
business  network.  In  particular,  they highlight  that  InfoSec management  process  does  not  always
follow the script depicted in standards or other models of InfoSec management and may indeed appear
as  non-linear  and  non-systematic.  In  brief,  the  study provides  InfoSec  managers  a  more  holistic
understanding of the InfoSec management. Consequently, they may be able to make more informed
decisions in their InfoSec management practice (see Table 2).
1. When implementing InfoSec controls acknowledge and account for the multiple stakeholders involved. 
While there may be different tensions between the stakeholders that should be accounted for, different 
stakeholders may also be a rich resource for InfoSec management. 
2. Acknowledge the existence and impact of organizational, business network and wider social structures to 
InfoSec management. Social structures shape how people behave. 
3. Keep in mind that InfoSec management standards and frameworks are important, but limited in providing 
understanding of the practical realities of your organization. Knowing the general standards and frameworks 
can never substitute knowing the minute and particular organizational practices – only supplement it.  
Table 2: Implications for practice
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